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UNFRIENDING THE STORED
COMMUNICATIONS ACT:
HOW TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT AND
LEGISLATIVE INACTION HAVE RENDERED
ITS PROTECTIONS OBSOLETE
I. INTRODUCTION
"Admit it, you're guilty. Repeat after me, my name is
and I am a Facebook addict."' Or if you are still in denial
about being a social media site addict,2 you may at least be willing
to admit that you know someone who is. Perhaps that person is
among the fifth of young female users who check their Facebook
accounts in the middle of the night.' Or perhaps she, too-like
over half of young female users-talks to her friends more online
than she does face-to-face.4 In light of such startling numbers, it is
evident that social networking sites are one of the most prominent
Internet trends.' As of November 2011, Facebook had over 800
1. Kayla Webley, It's Time to Confront Your Facebook Addiction, TIME.COM
(July 8, 2010), http://newsfeed.time.com/2010/07/08/its-time-to-confront-your-
facebook-addiction/#ixzzl42nXq3Hz.
2. One researcher found that while "Facebook addiction" or "Facebook
addiction disorder" are not medically approved terms, the reality of addictive
behaviors on Facebook are a growing problem for many Facebook users, and
one that therapists are seeing more frequently in their patients. Elizabeth
Cohen, Five Clues that You Are Addicted to Facebook, CNN Health (Apr. 23,
2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/04/23/ep.facebook.addict/index
.html ?iref=storysearch. In a recent study of 1,605 adults surveyed on their
social media habits, 39% are self-described Facebook "addicts." Benn Parr, The
First Thing Young Women Do in the Morning: Check Facebook [STUDY],
Mashable.com (July 7, 2010), http://mashable.com/2010/07/07/oxygen-
facebook-study/.
3. Parr, supra note 2.
4. Id.
5. Katherine Minotti, The Advent of Digital Diaries: Implications of Social
Networking Web Sites for the Legal Profession, 60 S.C. L. REV. 1057, 1058
(2009). See also Ryan A. Ward, Discovering Facebook: Social Network
Subpoenas and the Stored Communications Act, 24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 563,
75
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million active users, over half of which log on every day. Social
networking now accounts for one out of every six minutes spent on
the internet. And perhaps most striking is that this unprecedented
phenomenon shows no sign of slowing down.'
In fact, social media sites are having an ever-increasing
influence on society, one which reaches even beyond the Internet.
Unsatisfied with a mere online presence, these sites have taken on
a life of their own, pervading almost every aspect of our existence
complete with their own lexicon and etiquette.' No longer do we
simply use Facebook, but we "facebook"" our friends. No longer
do we need to talk to someone face to face to share information,
instead we can "tweet."" And if we have a falling out with a
friend, we no longer have to bother to tell her, we can simply
"unfriend"l2 her.
563 (2011) ("Americans spend over 20% of their online time on social networks
and blogs.").
6. Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics
(last visited Nov. 20, 2011, 12:17 PM).
7. Ben Parr, Social Networking Accounts for 1 of Every 6 Minutes Spent
Online [STATS], MASHABLE, (June 15, 2011), http://mashable.com/
2011/06/15/social-networking-accounts-for-i -of-every-6-minutes-spent-online-
stats/.
8. In America alone, Facebook's user base increased 454.5% between July
2008 and April 2011. See Nick Burcher, Facebook Usage Statistics by Country
- July 2010 Compared to July 2009 and July 2008, Nick Burcher (July 2, 2010),
http://www.nickburcher.com/2010/07/facebook-usage-statistics-by-
country.html; Nick Burcher, Facebook Usage Statistics 1st April 2011 vs April
2010 vs April 2009, Nick Burcher (Apr. 05, 2011),
http://www.nickburcher.com/2011/04/facebook-usage-statistics-1st-april.html.
9. See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
10. Troy Janisch, Facebook a Verb? That's What's Happenin', SOCIAL
METEOR (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.socialmeteor.com/2009/09/02/facebook-a-
verb-thats-whats-happenin/.
11. See TWITTER, http://twitter.com/about (last visited Nov. 20, 2011, 8:23
PM).
12. The term is now official - Oxford Word of the Year 2009: Unfriend,
OUPBLOG (Nov. 16, 2009), http://blog.oup.com/2009/11/unfriend/. See also
Emma Barnett, Facebook's 'Unfriend' Verb is Voted 'Word of the Year', THE
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/
facebook/6591614/Facebooks-Unfriend-verb-is-voted--Word-of-the-Year.html.
76
2
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol22/iss1/4
UNFRIENDING THE SCA
As always, where society treads, the law soon follows. The
increased use of these sites provides attorneys with a wealth of
useful and discoverable information, which has had profound
implications on their trial strategies." For example, social media
sites allow users to upload pictures, text, videos, and personal
information onto their own personal "home-page," 4 and attorneys
have been quick to realize that these uploads sometimes provide
crucial evidence about the individual litigants that can have had an
immediate impact on the case at trial."
However, the use of information gathered from social media
sites is still subject to discovery and privacy rules. The more these
sites grow, the more important it becomes to define the scope of
discovery laws and the validity of subpoenas seeking this
information.'" Yet despite the importance of this question, it was
13. See generally Social Media Effects On Law and the Legal System, CLEAN
CUT MEDIA (Feb. 13, 2009), http://www.cleancutmedia.com/news/social-media-
effects-on-law-and-the-legal-system; JOHN G. BROWNING, THE LAWYER'S
GUIDE TO SOCIAL NETWORKING: UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL MEDIA'S IMPACT ON
THE LAW (2010).
14. More than thirty billion pieces of content (web links, news stories, blog
posts, notes, photo albums, etc.) are shared each month. Internet 2010 in
numbers, PINGDOM (Jan. 12, 2011), http://royal.pingdom.com/
2011/01/12/internet-2010-in-numbers/.
15. Facebook's major contribution has been to discovery: "The growing use
of social networking web sites presents opportunities for lawyers to gather
evidence from these . . . sites [for use in both] criminal and civil cases."
Minotti, supra note 5, at 1059. With lawyers' increased access to this evidence,
unwitting plaintiffs in personal injury cases are routinely caught out by
incriminating pictures of them posted on social media sites such as Facebook
and MySpace. See, e.g., Benjamin Rolf et al., The Usefulness of Social
Networking Websites to a Resourceful Defense Team, 3 STRICTLY SPEAKING 1,
available at http://www.dri.org/ContentDirectory/Public/Newsletters/
0200/2008%20Product%20Liability%20Committee%20Strictly%2OSpeaking%
20Winter.pdf. Defendants have also been caught out. See, e.g., Minotti, supra
note 5, at 1059-60.
16. This has particularly large ramifications in the United States, a country
that not only has a reputation for being litigious but is also but home to over a
quarter of all Facebook users. See Facebook Users in the World,
Facebook Usage and Facebook Penetration Statistics by World Geographic
Regions, INTERNET USER STATS USAGE AND POPULATION STATISTICS,
http://www.intemetworldstats.com/facebook.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2011).
2011] 77
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not until May of 2010 that a court17 first considered whether
subpoenas served directly on social networking sites can be
quashed under current statutory law, the Stored Communications
Act ("SCA")." In that case the court held that the SCA does not
require a social media service to respond to a subpoena for
discovery information.19 However, it also noted that the SCA is
outdated and does not adequately apply to modem
communications.2 0  This Comment agrees with the court's
criticism of the Act and contends that the legislature must either
radically reform or completely replace the SCA because it does not
provide a sufficient framework with which courts can consistently
determine whether subpoenas are valid. Congress has not reacted
to the advances in technology and the subsequent changes in how
we communicate, which has now rendered the law obsolete.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the SCA.2 It
first details the history of the Act; it then explains the reasons for
its enactment and provides an overview of its traditional
interpretation. Part III then focuses on the recent application of the
Act by dissecting Crispin v. Christian-Audigier, Inc., the first case
to thoroughly analyze if and how the SCA should provide privacy
to users of social media sites.22 Part IV critiques the Crispin
decision. It examines how that court grappled with the difficulties
inherent in applying the SCA (a thirty-six year old statute) to
modem forms of social networking and communications. It also
attempts to rationalize the court's holding, explaining how the
court balanced the need to implement practical policies, despite
being constrained by the Act's dense and dated language. 23 It
highlights some of the broader social issues raised by the scope of
Internet privacy, and how other courts have tried to answer these
concerns. Finally, Part V focuses on the future of the Stored
17. Crispin v. Christian Audigier Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
18. Stored Wire and Electronics Communications and Transaction Record
Access (Stored Communications Act), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1860
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
19. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991.
20. Id. at 972 n.15.
21. See infra notes 25-104 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 105-171 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 172-191 and accompanying text.
78
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Communications Act.24 Illustrated through Crispin, this Part
reveals the current law's failings and how the SCA must either be
amended or replaced to implement Congress' original intent. In
the face of technological advancements, the SCA can no longer
provide an adequate legal framework for privacy protections.
II. BACKGROUND
A thorough understanding of the Stored Communications
Act ("SCA") is necessary to comprehend the Crispin court's
decision and the further policy implications that arise from it.
First, this section examines the law prior to the SCA and highlights
the major deficiencies that led to its enactment.25 It then explains
how the SCA has been interpreted and how it works to protect the
privacy of electronic communications.2 6
A. Gaps in the Law
The American legal system has not always afforded all citizens
the same rights to privacy that are enjoyed today. English jurist
Sir Edward Coke famously wrote that "[t]he house of every one is
to him as his castle and fortress." 27 But while this concept was
firmly entrenched in English jurisprudence,28 there was no similar
protection in early American history.29 In response,30 the Framers
24. See infra notes 192-219 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 28-46 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 47-105 and accompanying text.
27. Semayne's Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.), 5 Co. Rep. 91 a.
28. The concept of privacy "is as old as the basic concepts of English
common law." WILLIAM & MARY MORRIS, MORRIS DICTIONARY OF WORD
AND PHRASE ORIGINS 374 (2d ed. 1988).
29. In the years preceding the Bill of Rights, the American government of the
time repeatedly engaged in "ill use of the warrant process to engage in
suspicionless searches and seizures." THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 20 (2008). See also Thomas
K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 514 (1994).
30. The Fourth Amendment was, at least in part, designed to "protect
individual citizens from unfettered invasions . . . into their homes." ROBERT M.
792011]
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passed the Fourth Amendment," requiring the federal
government 32 to obtain a judicially sanctioned warrant based on
probable cause before entering and searching private property."
Fast forward to 1986, as the Fourth Amendment approaches its
two-hundredth birthday. In some respects the Fourth Amendment
had aged well-its protections for a man's castle are still strong.34
However, the guiding aim behind the Fourth Amendment was
broader than the protection of homes.35 In this respect, its age was
betraying it; the Fourth Amendment alone was ill-suited to apply
its intended protections when faced with new technologies.3 6
Noting this gap in protection and the potentially devastating
effects that it had on privacy," Congress sought to remedy the
BLOOM, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND WARRANTS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION xvii (Jack Stark ed., 2003).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated . ... ).
32. The Supreme Court has since held that the Fourth Amendment also
applies to state government by way of incorporation through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
33. JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., I SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.1 (3d ed. 2000).
34. JAMES A. ADAMS, OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 121: STORED WIRE AND
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS
(2010), available at LEXIS, 18 US NITA prec 2701.
35. The Fourth Amendment was intended to "'protect personal privacy and
dignity against [all] unwarranted intrusion by the State."' Alexander Scolnik,
Note, Protections for Electronic Communications: The Stored Communications
Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 352 (2009) (quoting
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)).
36. S. REP. No. 541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555
("When the Framers of the Constitution acted to guard against the arbitrary use
of government power to maintain surveillance over citizens, there were limited
methods of intrusion into the 'houses, papers, and effects' protected by the
Fourth Amendment. During the intervening 200 years, development of new
methods of communication and devices for surveillance has expanded
dramatically the opportunity for such invasions.").
37. S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 37-38 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2122, 2154 ("The tremendous scientific and technological developments that
have taken place in the last century have made possible today the widespread
use and abuse of electronic surveillance techniques. As a result of these
developments, privacy of communication is seriously jeopardized by these
techniques of surveillance ... . Both proponents and opponents of wiretapping
80
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situation by passing the Wiretap Act." However, this Act was
limited in scope" and once again technological advances outpaced
the legislature's ability to react.4 0 Even through several
amendments to the Wiretap Act, Congress was unable to
adequately address the "rapid advances in telecommunications
wrought by the proliferations of computers and computer
technology."4 1
Only eighteen years later, Congress passed the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act.42 Title II of this Act is the Stored
Communications Act, which deals specifically with privacy for
stored communications.43 This Act was designed to plug the holes
in protection left by the Fourth Amendment by "creat[ing] a set of
Fourth Amendment-like privacy protections."4 4 Currently, it is the
and electronic surveillance agree that the present state of law in this area is
extremely unsatisfactory and that the Congress should act to clarify the resulting
confusion.").
38. Title Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. 90-
351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-17 (2006)).
39. It sought only to protect electronic information from being "intercepted."
Id. Moreover, the legislation did not attempt to protect certain, now prevalent,
forms of information such as text, digital, or machine communications. See S.
REP. No. 90-1097, at 38, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154. The
House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary concluded that the
Wiretap Act's "statutory framework appears to have left unprotected an
important sector of the new communications technologies. . . . Under existing
law the interception . . . or the disclosure of [the most common
communications] are probably not regulated or restricted." H. REP. No. 99-647,
at 17 18 (1986).
40. "Although it is not twenty years old, the Wiretap Act was written in
different technological . .. era [sic]." H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 17 (1986).
41. Carlos Perez-Albuerne & Lawrence Friedman, Article, Privacy
Protection for Electronic Communications and the "Interception- Unauthorized
Access "Dilemma, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 435, 438 (2001).
42. Congress passed this Act in part to replace the Wiretap Act, but also to
create greater protections. Electronic Communications and Privacy Act, Pub. L.
99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
43. Stored Wire and Electronics Communications and Transaction Record
Access (Stored Communications Act), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1860
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
44. Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislature's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1212 (2004).
More specifically, it sought to "creat[e] a zone of privacy to protect Internet
2011] 8 1
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only federal statutory protection for electronic communications
that are held in storage.45
B. The Stored Communications Act
The Stored Communications Act was passed in response to fears
that the Fourth Amendment alone could not adequately protect
Internet communications from unreasonable government
interference.46 Moreover, the Act was specifically tailored to
address the three main failings of the Fourth Amendment as
applied to Internet communications.4 7
The first main failing of the Fourth Amendment was that it only
applied when the subject of the search had a reasonable
expectation of privacy.48 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that a user does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
information that he discloses to a third party.4 9 An expansive
interpretation of this doctrine would eliminate a person's Fourth
Amendment protection for any information sent through e-mail or
posted on Internet forums, as this information is disclosed to the
Internet Service Provider ("ISP") during transmission."o Second,
subscribers from having their personal information wrongfully used and
publically disclosed." Timothy G. Ackerman, Consent and Discovery Under
the Stored Communications Act, THE FED. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 42.
45. MATTHEW BENDER & CO., 1-2 PRIVACY LAW AND THE USA PATRIOT
ACT § 2.19 (2010).
46. See Kerr, supra note 44 and accompanying text.
47. Although these three reasons are briefly outlined below, see Kerr, supra
note 44, at 1210-1212 for a more detailed analysis.
48. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
49. This is often called the Miller principle, from United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976). For a more detailed analysis of this principle, see MATTHEW
BENDER & CO., supra note 45, § 2.05.
50. In the context of e-mails, there is still debate as to whether the user
retains a reasonable expectation of privacy. However, at least one court has
now held that a user does have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an e-mail.
Warshak v. United States, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th. Cir. 2010). The Warshak
court held that because there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Fourth
Amendment applies and therefore the police must obtain a warrant in order to
compel disclosure of documents from an ISP. Id. The court also held that
insomuch as the SCA allowed such disclosure with anything less that a warrant
82
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the Fourth Amendment does not provide sufficient safeguards
from the government with respect to remotely stored information;
the government can access electronic data stored with a third party
by serving that third party with a subpoena, even if it does not
have probable cause." Finally, the Fourth Amendment does not
apply to searches effected by private parties.5 2 Thus, under the
Fourth Amendment alone, there is nothing to stop an ISP from
searching personal communications in its capacity as a private
party and then voluntarily disclosing this information to
governmental agencies.
Congress recognized the apparent inequity in the treatment of
electronic information and physical communications," and
accordingly passed the SCA to remedy these problems in two main
ways. The first manner in which the SCA seeks to buttress Fourth
Amendment rights is by restricting a covered provider54 from
it is unconstitutional. Id. But the issue is still far from clear; as yet this is the
first and only court to rule on the issue in this way. At least in the context of
social media sites however, the answer to whether users have legitimate
expectation of privacy appears to be clearer. "In [respect to social media sites
such as Facebook and MySpace], privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable
expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful
thinking." Dana L. Fleming & Joseph M. Herlihy, What Happens When the
College Rumor Mill Goes Online, Bos. BAR. J., Jan./Feb. 2009, at 16.
51. Kerr, supra note 44, at 1211-12.
52. The Fourth Amendment is "wholly inapplicable 'to a search or seizure,
even an unreasonable one, effected by a private [party] not acting as an agent of
the Government . . . .' United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)
(quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
53. See S. REP No. 99-541, at 5 (1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3557,
3559. Courts have since strived to implement that intent; O'Grady v. Superior
Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 87 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) ("A fundamental purpose of
the SCA [was] to lessen the disparities between the protections given to
established modes of private communication and those accorded new
communications media"); Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 341 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir.
2003), amended by 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Just as trespass protects
those who rent space from a commercial storage facility to hold sensitive
documents . . . the Act protects users whose electronic communications are in
electronic storage with an ISP or other electronic communications facility.").
54. See infra notes 64-82 and accompanying text for an explanation of when
a provider is subject to the SCA.
832011]
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voluntarily disclosing an individual's information to the
government." Secondly, the SCA limits the government's ability
to require those providers to disclose those communications or
records."
Although these goals may appear simple, their implementation
has provided difficulties for courts since the Statute's enactment."
The SCA is far from clear, and its application and interpretation
has been difficult. Both its language and interplay with other titles
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act has been variously
called "confusing and uncertain"" and "complex [and]
convoluted."" However, it is clear that Congress did not intend to
design a catch-all to protect each and every electronically stored
communication;60 rather, its application, and thus protections, is
limited.6 1 This Comment now provides an overview as to the
instances in which the SCA applies.
1. Preliminary Questions to Determine the Applicability of the
SCA
The "focal point" of the Stored Communications Act is the
entity that is currently in possession of the communication that the
subpoena seeks to acquire. Therefore, the first question to ask
when applying the SCA is whether the party who has the requested
information is covered by the Act.62 If the entity is not covered,
then the extra protections offered by the SCA do not apply, and the
55. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (2006).
56. See id. § 2703(a).
57. Both commentators and courts alike have noted the Act and the
surrounding area of law for its "lack of clarity." Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v.
Unites States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994). See also Kerr
supra note 44, at 1208 ("The [SCA] is dense and confusing and few cases exist
explaining how the statute works.").
58. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002).
59. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998).
60. Kerr, supra note 44, at 1214.
61. See infra notes 62-73 and accompanying text. For a more detailed
analysis see Kerr, supra note 44. See also RAYMOND T. NIMMER, 4 THE LAW
OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 17:32 (4th ed. 2010).
62. Kerr, supra note 44, at 1213.
84
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party seeking to withhold the information must rely solely on the
often insufficient Fourth Amendment.63 The restrictions regarding
disclosure of electronically stored information apply only to a
person or entity that provides, to the public, either an Electronic
Communications Service (ECS) or a Remote Computing Service
(RCS).64 From this basic definition come two very important
questions: (1) how to determine which persons or entities are
public, and (2) whether that entity is providing an ECS, an RCS,
both, or neither.
The first of these questions-whether an entity is public or
private-is relatively clear.6 5 Although the SCA does not provide
a definition of the word "public," an entity provides a service "to
the public" if it provides that service to "the community at large,"
whether or not it charges a fee.66 This excludes systems that are
proprietary or purely intra-company,67 or situations in which the
services are only available to users with a special relationship to
the entity providing the service.6 8
The second question-whether an entity is providing an
electronic communications service, a remote computing service,
both, or neither-is much more difficult, and is often at the heart
of SCA litigation." The Act only applies to ECS and RCS
providers; if an entity does not fit within these technical
definitions, then it "can disclose or use with impunity the contents
63. Id.
64. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)-(b), 2703(a)-(b) (2006). See also Wesley College
v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 389 (D. Del. 1997) ("[A] person who does not
provide an electronic communication service [or a remote communication
service] . . . can disclose or use with impunity the contents of an electronic
communication unlawfully obtained from electronic storage.").
65. See Kerr, supra note 44, at 1226.
66. See Anderson Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1042-43
(N.D. 111. 1998).
67. See NIMMER, supra note 66, § 17:32.
68. See Anderson Consulting LLP, 991 F. Supp. at 1042-43.
69. See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 341 F.3d 978, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2003);
Sherman & Co. v. Salton Maxim Housewares, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 817, 820
(E.D. Mich. 2000); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623,
635-36 (E.D. Pa. 2001); In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d
497, 511-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
2011] 85
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of an electronic communication .. ."70 The SCA defines an ECS
as an entity that "provides to users thereof the ability to send or
receive wire or electronic communications."7 ' An RCS is defined
as "the provision to the public of computer storage or processing
services by means of an electronic communications system."72
The SCA further defines electronic communications system as
"any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic
facilities for the transmission of wire or electronic
communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic
equipment for the electronic storage of such communications."
The ECS/RCS inquiry has been problematic for several reasons.
First, the current law has simply not kept pace with technological
advancement. Although computer technology has significantly
developed since 1986 (when the SCA was enacted) the statute has
not been altered, effectively "freezing into the law the
understandings of computer network use as of 1986."74 Following
the seismic advances in technology, many of today's entities no
longer fit neatly within these two distinct categories, 75 making
application of the Act problematic. This in turn leads to the
second difficulty in making the ECS/RCS distinction: the current
case law has tended to blur the line between these two types of
providers as judges have bent definitions in order to afford
protection under the statute, even when the plain language of the
Act makes it clear that it should not have been." This second
inquiry is also made difficult because these definitions are highly
context sensitive; an entity can act as an ECS with respect to one
70. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 973 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (citing Wesley College v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 389 (D. Del. 1997)).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15).
72. Id. § 2711(2).
73. Id. § 2510(14).
74. Kerr, supra note 44, at 1214.
75. See S. Rep. 99-541, at 2-3 (1986) (discussing how the increases in
computing power since 1986 had led to a concomitant shift in how data is stored
and processed, but noting there was no corresponding amendment to existing
law, leaving outdated practices as the basis for the current statutory scheme);
Kerr, supra note 46, at 1213-14, 1235.
76. Kerr, supra note 44, at 1215. This results in a lack of consistent and clear
case law.
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communication and an RCS with respect to another. Also, an
entity's role with respect to a single communication can change
over time.7 1
Finally, even if the Act does apply to a certain entity, it may not
apply to the actual communication that is being sought. A
provider of an ECS is only prohibited from disclosing the contents
of a communication while that information is being held "in
storage." 79 For an ECS, the SCA defines "storage" as either (A)
"any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof,
[or] (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic
communication service for purposes of back-up protection of such
77. The SCA focuses on the information being sought and the entity's
relationship to that specific piece of information.
78. "Today, most ISPs provide both ECS and RCS; thus, the distinction
serves to define the service that is being provided at a particular times (or as to a
particular piece of electronic communication at a particular time), rather than to
define the service provider itself." In re United States, 665 F. Supp. 2d. 1210,
1214 (D. Or. 2009). Orin S. Kerr gives a more detailed example of how an
entity's role can shift over time.
Imagine that I send an e-mail to my friend Jane who has an
account at a commercial ISP. When the message first arrives
at the ISP, the ISP acts a provider of ECS with respect to the
e-mail. The e-mail is in 'electronic storage' awaiting Jane's
retrieval of the message. Once Jane retrieves my e-mail, she
can either delete the message from the ISP's server or leave
the message stored on the ISP's server for safekeeping. If
Jane chooses to store the e-mail with the ISP, the ISP now acts
as a provider of RCS [and possibly also an ECS, depending on
the jurisdiction] with respect to that copy of the e-mail so long
as the ISP is . . . public. The role of the ISP has [increased]
from [solely] a transmitter of the e-mail to a storage facility
available to the public, from an ECS to an RCS [and ECS] ...
. If Jane downloads a copy of the e-mail onto her personal
computer, the tSP acts as neither a provider of ECS nor RCS
with respect to the downloaded copy regardless of whether the
ISP is available to the public. The ISP is not holding the
downloaded copy either incident to transmission or for
storage; in fact, the ISP does not hold that copy at all.
Kerr, supra note 44, at 1216-17 (internal citations omitted).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006).
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communication."" In contrast, an RCS provider is only prohibited
from disclosing consumer information that is kept "for the purpose
of providing [remote] storage or computer processing services to
[the] subscriber or customer."' Importantly, neither of these
definitions includes information that has been "intercepted."8 2
2. Voluntary Disclosure
With these basic definitions in mind, a more thorough
examination of the Act, and what it prohibits, is possible.
Section 2702 of the Act prohibits any covered entity from
voluntarily disclosing both the customer's actual communications
(content information) and the "record[s] or other information
pertaining to [the] customer" (non content information)." The Act
provides for different standards of protection for these two basic
forms of information.8 4
80. Id. § 2510(17)(A)-(B). And, perhaps, unsurprisingly the various
jurisdictions have not interpreted the definition of "storage" uniformly. For
example, some jurisdictions hold that when an e-mail has been opened it is
neither (1) being held in storage (i.e. it is no longer temporary, intermediate
storage while delivery is pending), and (2) is also not being held for "back-up"
purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772 (C.D.
111. 2009); Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 362-63 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
However, some courts have taken a different approach. See, e.g., Theofel v.
Farey-Jones, 341 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2003). This split will be discussed
more below.
81. Crispin v. Christian Audigier Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 973 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2)).
82. "Intercept[ion]" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). For greater discussion
of the interplay between interception and unauthorized access and the difficulty
that the courts have in defining the precise boundaries between the two, see
Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 633 (E.D. Pa. 2001);
Perez-Albueme & Friedman, supra note 41. Also see generally Tatsuya
Akamine, Proposal For a Fair Statutory Interpretation: E-Mail Stored in a
Service Provider Computer is Subject to an Interception Under the Federal
Wiretap Act, 7 J. L. POL'Y 519 (1999).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (subject to the exceptions listed in § 2702(b))
provides the rules for the disclosure of content information, § 2702(c) provides
rules for non-content information.
84. The Act assists in determining what is content information, stating that
"'contents', when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic
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The SCA first states applicable rules for disclosure of content
information." Both public ECS providers and public RCS
providers are prohibited from knowingly divulging the contents of
any communication while held in electronic storage (in the case of
an ECS), or while providing remote storage or computer
processing services (in the case of an RCS).86
In contrast, the Act provides less protection for non-content
information." It only prohibits RCS and ECS providers from
disclosing such information to government entities." In addition
to this diluted protection, both of these provisions only apply if the
entity in question is providing a service to the public. Non-public
entities and entities providing services solely to private parties may
voluntarily disclose all information at will.89
communication, includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or
meaning of that communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8). Unfortunately this
definition is not clear; not only does it fail to give any examples, but it only
states what contents includes and does not actually define what it actually is.
Kerr, supra note 44, at 1228. Some courts have tried to supplement this
definition by attempting to clarify what is excluded from the definition of
content. Jessup-Morgan v. Am. Online, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1108 (E.D.
Mich. 2008).
85. Despite some ambiguity in the definition of "content information" the
body of an e-mail and the subject line are "content" information. Orin S. Kerr,
Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That
Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 607, 646 (2003).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)-(2).
87. Non-content information includes information that is incidental to the
main email text, such as the name of the sender, the recipient, the recipient's
address, the time sent, and the place from which it was sent. See COMPUTER
CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
SEARCHING & SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 122 (2002), available at
http://www.cybercrime.gov/ssmanual/03ssma.html.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (2006). Section 2702(c)(4) makes explicit that
there is no such prohibition from disclosure of non-content records to non-
governmental agencies in the list of exceptions for voluntary disclosure of
content information.
89. See, e.g., Sherman & Co. v. Salton Maxim Housewares, Inc., 94 F. Supp.
2d 817, 820 (E.D. Mich. 2000) ("Section 2702 prohibits disclosure of electronic
data, but this prohibition is limited to persons or entities that (1) provide an
electronic communication service to the public; or (2) provide remote
computing service to the public" (emphasis added)).
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3. Required Disclosure-Disclosure Compelled by the Government
In contrast to voluntary disclosure (which is regulated by section
2702), section 2703 of the Act establishes when a governmental
agency may compel disclosure of information from an ECS or
RCS." Whether disclosure is mandatory or voluntary is crucial
because different standards apply to each scenario, and the
protections afforded to an individual's privacy will be dependent
upon this distinction.9' Once again, the court must distinguish
between content and non-content information.92
The government may force an RCS to disclose the content of
any wire or electronic communication (i.e. content information) in
three basic ways.93 First, a government entity may require
disclosure without notice if it first obtains a warrant using either
(1) the procedures set forth by the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, or (2) in a state case, the applicable state procedures.94
This is the most onerous method for required disclosure. The
second and third methods are less burdensome, but the government
entity must give prior notice to the subscriber or customer. If it
does so, it may compel disclosure with either (1) an administrative
subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute or grand jury
trial or (2) a court order for such disclosure under section 2703(d)
of the Act.95 The rules controlling a government entity's attempt
to compel disclosure of content information from a provider of an
ECS are more complex. If the contents have been held in storage
for 180 days or less,96 the government may only compel disclosure
with a warrant.97 But if the content has been in electronic storage
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006).
91. See id. §§ 2702, 2703.
92. See id. § 2703.
93. Id. § 2703(b)(2).
94. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(A).
95. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i), (ii).
96. The rule adopted by the Ninth Circuit, which eschews the strict 180 day
time limits for a more flexible approach, asks whether the e-mail has "expired in
the normal course of business," making the test even less clear. Theofel v.
Farey-Jones, 359 F.2d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006).
90
16
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol22/iss1/4
UNFRIENDING THE SCA
for more than 180 days, the government may use any of the
methods enumerated in section 2703(b). 98
In contrast with the formidable procedures for compelled
disclosure of content information, the rules for compelled
disclosure of non-content information provide less protection.
Section 2703(c) regulates the compelled disclosure of non-content
information, which is identical for both ECS and RCS providers. 99
There are five methods by which the government can compel
disclosure: (1) obtaining a warrant, 00 (2) obtaining a court order as
defined under section 2703(d),"o' (3) obtaining consent of the
subscriber or customer,'0 2 (4) by written request to the subscriber
in the case of telemarketing fraud,'o or (5) by simple request to the
provider if the information is so called "basic subscriber
information."10 4
III. SUBJECT OPINION: CRISPIN V. CHRISTIAN AUDIGIER, INC.
As explained in the previous section, the SCA is not a "catch-all
statute designed to protect the privacy of [all] stored Internet
[communications and records]."' However, until Crispin, no
court had directly addressed whether the SCA applied to social
media sites.0 6 This part explores the Cripsin decision and
highlights the issues addressed in applying the Act to modern
communication technology.
98. Id. § 2703(b).
99. Id. § 2703(c).
100. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(A).
101. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(B).
102. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(C).
103. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(D).
104. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(E), (c)(2). See Kerr, supra note 44, at 1219 for analysis
of the term "basic-subscriber information." This information includes (but is
not limited to) name, address, connection records, and method of payment.
105. See generally supra notes 62-73; Kerr, supra note 44, at 1214-15.
106. "Although some courts have considered the SCA's application to
certain types of providers, none appears to have addressed whether social-
networking sites fall within the ambit of the statute." Crispin v. Christian
Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 977 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
912011]
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The Crispin case was, at its heart, a breach of contract case. The
plaintiff, Buckley Crispin, alleged that at some time between
November of 2005 and January of 2006, he granted the defendants
and their various sub-licensees, Christian Audigier, Inc., an oral
license to use various pieces of his artwork in a limited matter."'
He further alleged that the defendants violated this agreement,
resulting in a breach of contract, copyright infringement, and a
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'
In response, Christian-Audigier, Inc. served subpoenas on both
MySpace and Facebook, seeking not only basic subscriber
information, but also user content in the form of communications
between Crispin and a third party.'0 9  It claimed that this
information was relevant in determining the scope, nature, and
terms of the agreement and the measure of damages that Crispin
should be awarded if he prevailed on the merits."o
Crispin then filed an ex parte motion to quash the subpoenas
contending that, amongst other things, the social media sites were
prohibited from disclosing communications under sections
2701(a)(1) and (2) of the SCA."' The trial judge disagreed, and
refused to quash the subpoenas."2 Crispin appealed, and the case
moved up to the Circuit Court for the Central District of
California.
107. Id. at 968.
108. Id. Crispin alleged that the defendant not only "failed to include his
logo on a substantial quantity of apparel bearing his artwork, but at times they
attributed the artwork to another artist or to Audigier himself." Id.
109. Id. The defendants requested both content and non-content information
in their subpoenas.
110. Id. at 968-69.
111. Id. at 969.
112. The court concluded that the SCA did not apply because it only applies
to electronic communication service providers, and the defendants in the case at
bar were not ECS providers as defined in the statute. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d
at 969. In addition he concluded that the Stored Communications Act prohibits
only the voluntary disclosure of information by ECS providers, and does not
restrict disclosure compelled by subpoena. Id. at 969-70. He also found that
"the SCA prohibits only the disclosure of communications held in 'electronic
storage' by the ECS provider, and that the materials were not in electronic
storage as that term is defined in the statute." Id. at 970.
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The primary issue for the District Court, and the one that is
relevant here, was whether the subpoenas could be quashed under
the Stored Communications Act. In making its decision, the court
split the social media sites into their two predominant functions"
and examined the validity of the subpoenas separately for each.
The first function is a private messaging function, which is
comparable to traditional e-mail."4 The second function is more
akin to a traditional bulletin board in that it allows users to type
messages and notes and "pin them up" for everyone with access to
their page to see."5  For both functions, the validity of the
subpoenas depended on two key questions: (1) whether Facebook
and MySpace were entities covered by the Act (i.e. whether they
were either ECS or RCS providers), and (2) if so, whether the
information sought by the subpoenas was in "electronic storage"
for the purposes of the Act. If both of these questions were
answered in the affirmative, the subpoenas would have to be
quashed, but if not, the information sought would be discoverable
from both Facebook and MySpace."
A. Are Social Media Sites ECS or RCS providers?
1. Wall Posts/Comments
The court first considered whether the sites' wall posting and
comments features constituted either an ECS or RCS service."' in
ruling, the court analogized these functions to traditional electronic
bulletin board service (BBS), and therefore found the previous
113. Id. at 976-77.
114. Id. at 976.
115. The Facebook terminology for this is "posting" on someone's "wall," "a
space on each user's profile page that allow friends to post messages for the user
to see." Id. at 977 (quoting Facebook features, WiKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook features#Wall). MySpace has a similar
function which allows users to post a "comment" on another person's page. Id.
116. The Stored Communications Act does not interfere with regular
discovery from opposing parties, rather it only regulates disclosure of
information from a covered entity.
117. See id. at 987-88.
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case law regarding BBS "relevant, if not controlling.""' Previous
definitions equate BBS services with a "traditional cork-and-pin
bulletin board on which people post messages,"" 9 finding that they
were simply a modem equivalent of old technology.'2 0 The court
also found that the SCA was intended to cover electronic bulletin
boards, 2' so long as it is restricted in some fashion,'22 and therefore
restricted BBS websites are classed as ECS providers. The court
then found that Facebook was indistinguishable from a controlled-
access BBS,'23 and thus acts as an ECS so long as there is some
restriction on access.124
118. Id. at 980.
119. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 980-81 (citing United States v. Riggs, 739
F. Supp. 414, 417 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1990)).
120. See, e.g., Riggs, 739 F. Supp. at 417 n.4 (BBS services "simulate[] an
actual bulletin board by allowing computer users who access a particular
computer to post messages, read existing messages, and delete messages.").
121. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 981 (citing United States v. Steiger, 318
F.3d 1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2003); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d
868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002)).
122. Although the legislative history and subsequent case law have made
clear that computer bulletin board services may be covered by the Act, it has
made equally clear that "[o]nly electronic bulletin boards which are not readily
accessible to the public are protected." Kaufman v. Nest Seekers, LLC, No. 05
CV 6782(GBD), 2006 WL 2807177, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2006).
Therefore unless the BBS is "configured in some way so as to limit access by
the general public" it is not protected under the SCA. Id. (citing Snow v.
DirecTV Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1322 (1lth Cir. 2006)). See also S. Rep. 99-541,
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3590 ("The bill does not for example
hinder the development or use of 'electronic bulletin boards' [when the] service
[is] widely known and [it] does not require any special access code or warning
to indicate that the information is private. To access a communication in such a
public system is not a violation of the Act, since the general public has been
'authorized' to do so by the facility provider.").
123. Facebook wall postings can only be viewed by someone who has been
granted access to the user's profile page. Absent the most lax privacy settings
(which allow anyone to view the user's wall) this acts as a restriction similar to
password protection on a BBS.
124. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d 981-82 (citing Kaufinan, 2006 WL 2807177,
at *5).
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2. Private Messaging Service
The court held that there was no distinction between both
Facebook's and MySpace's private messaging service and a
traditional web-based e-mail service. 125 Because providers of such
traditional e-mail services are undisputedly ECS providers there
was no doubt that Facebook and MySpace were ECS providers
with respect to that service. 26
B. Was the Information Sought in Storage as Defined by the
Statue?
Determining if the entity provides either an ECS or RCS service
is only the first stage in determining if communications are
covered by the SCA; even if an entity is such a service it is only
prohibited from disclosing information held in certain forms of
storage. An ECS is only prohibited from disclosing information in
"electronic storage."i 27  The SCA provides two definitions of
electronic storage. The first definition of storage ("type A"
storage) includes "any temporary, intermediate storage or a wire
or electronic communications incidental to the transmission
therefore." 2 8 The second definition of electronic storage ("type B"
storage) is "any storage of such communication by an electronic
communication service for purposes of back-up protection of such
communication."l2 9 In contrast an RCS is only prohibited from
disclosing information held in "remote storage."'
125. Id. at 982.
126. See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 902 (9th Cir.
2008); Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.2d 978, 1982 (9th Cir. 2004); see also
PATRICIA L. BELLIA ET AL., CYBERLAW: PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 584 (2d ed. 2004).
127. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A) (emphasis added).
129. Id. at § 2510(17)(B) (emphasis added).
130. Id. at § 2702(a)(2)(B).
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1. E-Mails
Unopened e-mails have posed few analytical problems for the
courts; a clear majority of jurisdictions hold that unopened e-mails
are in "electronic storage" for the purposes of the Stored
Communications Act.'"' Specially, most courts have held that
unopened e-mails are held in type A, temporary and intermediate
storage.'32  To fully understand the courts' reasoning, a brief
overview of how e-mail works is necessary."' In short, after a
message is sent by the sender, it is stored on the ISP's server;
however, this particular form of storage ceases when the message
is delivered, i.e., when it is retrieved by the intended recipient.'34
Therefore the courts have held that this form of storage is the
archetypal example of Type A "temporary and intermediate"
storage."'
Whether or not opened e-mails are also held in electronic
storage has been a more contentious question. Generally, all
courts agree that an opened e-mail does not fit within the definition
of type A storage."' Therefore, whether a communication is in
131. See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 341 F.3d 978, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2003);
Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 635-36 (E.D. Pa.
2001); In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 511-12
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
132. Theofel, 341 F.3d 984-85; Fraser, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 635-36; In re
Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 511-12.
133. This Comment only details enough of the basics necessary for an
understanding of the case law. For a more detailed analysis see generally David
J. Loundry, E-Law 4: Computer Information Systems Law and System Operator
Liability, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1075 (1998).
134. Email Sever FAQ - Part One, VICOMsoFT (2002),
http://www.vicomsoft.com/downloads/leaming/emailqa.pdf; Email Sever FAQ
- Part Two, VIcoMsOFT (2002), http://www.vicomsoft.com/
downloads/learning/email2_qa.pdf.
135. See, e.g., Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075 (9th Cir. 2004).
136. Once an e-mail has been opened its "continued storage [can]not be
construed as 'temporary' or 'incidental to' [its] transmission, [and therefore is
not in Type A storage]." Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 361 (E.D.
Mich. 2008). Other courts agree, as did a house committee: "' [T]emporary,
intermediate storage' describes an e-mail message that is being held by a third
party Internet service provider until it is requested to be read." In re
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"electronic storage" (and in turn whether an entity can be
classified as an ECS) depends upon whether the opened e-mail is
held in the other type of electronic storage-type B storage. Type
B storage is "any storage of [a] communication by an electronic
communication service for purposes of back-up protection of such
communication."'17 Unfortunately, neither the SCA itself, nor its
legislative history, nor any court interpreting the Act has given a
precise definition of "back-up protection," which has led to
varying approaches to this issue.' Such was the judicial
landscape that the Crispin court found itself facing when it
addressed this question.
Previously, the Ninth Circuit had held that a copy of a
communication stored on an ISP's server may be for back-up
purposes, even if that communication had already been read.'39 In
Theofel v. Farey-Jones, the court held that such a communication
is held as a back-up because an "obvious purpose . . . is to provide
a second copy of the message in the event that the user needs to
download it again-if, for example, the message is accidentally
erased from [his] own computer."'4 0 Because this back-up function
was a purpose of storage, even if not the sole purpose, the
communication was in storage, and therefore the ISP was acting as
an ECS.14' Similarly in Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., the
Ninth Circuit held that permanent "archiving" of text messages by
a pager service could be for "back-up" purposes.'42 The Quon
Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. at 512 (quoting H. REP. No. 106-932, at 11 n.7
(2000)).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(B).
138. Crispin v. Christian Audigier Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 983 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (citing Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d, 107 114 (3d. Cir.
2003)).
139. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075.
140. Id.
141. Id. Also the court noted that there was nothing in the Act that required
the back-up to be for the benefit of the ISP as opposed to the user. Id.
142. 529 F.3d 892, 901 (9th Cir. 2008) ("We turn to the plain language of the
SCA, including its common-sense definitions, to properly categorize Arch
Wireless. An ECS is defined as 'any service which provides to users thereof the
ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.' . . . On its face,
this describes the text-messaging pager services that Arch Wireless provided ...
. Contrast that definition with that for an RCS, which 'means the provision to
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court rejected the idea that archival necessarily suggested
"permanent storage," as opposed to "back-up storage," the former
of which would transform the entity into an RCS provider, and
therefore subject to lesser restrictions on disclosure of
information.'4 3
But other courts have disagreed and distinguished the
Theofel/Quon approach. Primarily those courts have noted that
Quon appeared to oversimplify the issue, and that the so-called
"common sense definitions" it applied in determining whether an
entity is providing "back-up storage" or "remote storage" (and
therefore whether an entity is an ECS or an RCS) were flawed.'"
Also, those courts, most notably the court in United States v.
Weaver,'45 made clear that court's reasoning in Theofel "relie[d] on
the assumption that users download e-mails from an ISP's server
to their own computer."'4 6 The difference between web-based and
non-web based e-mail providers is key.'47 In contrast to the user in
Theofel, who had downloaded his e-mails to his own computer, in
the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic
communications system.' . . . Arch Wireless did not provide to the City
'computer storage'; nor did it provide 'processing services.' By archiving the
text messages on its server, Arch Wireless certainly was 'storing' the messages.
However, Congress contemplated this exact function could be performed by an
ECS as well, stating that of this an ECS would provide (A) temporary storage
incidental to the communication; and (B) storage for back-up protection.").
143. Id.
144. By applying these "common sense definitions," the Quon court attempts
to determine what kind of provider an entity is in a vacuum, without considering
the exact role the entity plays at a specific time, with regards to a specific piece
of information. Other courts have eschewed this approach. "Today, most ISPs
provide both ECS and RCS; thus, the distinction serves to define the service that
is being provided at a particular time (or as to a particular piece of electronic
communication at a particular time), rather than to define the service provider
itself." In re United States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1214 (D. Or. 2009).
145. 636 F. Supp. 2d 769 (C.D. 111. 2009).
146. Id. at 772.
147. See Web-Based E-mail (Hotmail) VS Desktop E-mail (Outlook),
ZHACKS.com (Mar. 08, 2010), http://www.zhacks.com/tag/compare-web-and-
desktop-email!. A user of a web-based e-mail provider does not download
his/her messages, instead they are stored solely with the provider. However a
user of a non-web based e-mail service actually downloads his e-mails to his
own personal computer. Id.
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Weaver the party was using a web-based e-mail service.
Therefore, the defendant in Weaver had not downloaded his e-
mails; instead, the communications were held by the provider.
The court held that when a user stored his e-mails solely with the
entity in question, the entity is not providing a back-up, but is
instead a form of storage; therefore, it is a functioning as RCS.'4 8
In other words, at the time that the e-mails were opened and stored
solely with the e-mail provider, the entity "ceased to be an ECS
provider and became an RCS provider."'49 The court in Flagg v.
City of Detroit agreed with the Weaver court logic.'" Both of
these courts distinguished Quon, noting its application to be
excessively rigid and at "unitary.""'
148. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 772. Importantly in distinguishing Theofel,
the Weaver court also noted that web-based e-mail is now the default type of
internet service. Id. "Thus, unless a Hotmail user varies from default use, the
remote computing service is the only place he or she stores messages." Id.
James Dempsey puts this distinction in context. "In the past, particularly at the
time when [the Stored Communications Act] was written, many e-mail users
accessed their e-mail by downloading it onto their personal computers. . . .
Now, many users [do not, and their] e-mail . . . sits [solely] on a third party
server." James X. Dempsey, Digital Search & Seizure: Standards for
Government Access to Communications and Associated Data, 970 PLI/Pat 687,
707 (2009). The Weaver court explicitly noted the change in technology and
sought to keep abreast of it when coming to a decision.
149. Crispin v. Christian Audigier Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 985 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (discussing Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 769).
150. Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346 (E.D. Mich. 2008). In Flagg
the entity in question ("SkyTel") had been providing the city of Detroit with text
messaging services. Id. at 362-63. By the time the law suit was bought SkyTel
had ceased to be an active provider of messaging services; however, it did still
maintain a database of messages that had been sent and received during the
service contract. Id. at 363. The court held that by the time of the suit SkyTel
had become an RCS provider - there was not and could not be any "back-up" as
the original messages no longer existed. Rather it now served as a "virtual filing
cabinet" or remote storage location for the city, a classic RCS function. Id.
151. By focusing on the original purpose of the entity the Quon court fails to
take into account that the SCA can apply differently to different copies of
communications at different times. Also, this approach has been criticized as
"unitary" in so much as it tends to suggest that "service providers contract with
their customers to provide either an ECS or and RCS, but not both." Id. at 362.
The Act's proper focus is on the "specific type of [storage] being provided with
992011]
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The Crispin court came down in favor of the Flagg/Weaver
approach. It held that until the messages were opened, they are in
"temporary and intermediate" storage and that therefore Facebook
and MySpace were acting as ECS providers. But it also held that
once the private messages had been opened by Crispin, they were
neither in "temporary intermediate storage" nor in "back-up
storage," and that the entities providing those services were not
acting as ECS providers.'52 Instead, the messages were held in
remote storage, and the entities were operating as RCS
providers.'53
2. Wall Posts/Comments
According to the Crispin court, "the Facebook wall and
MySpace comments present a distinct and [even] more difficult
problem"'54 than private messages. Although it noted that many
courts had previously held that a BBS is "the paradigmatic type of
entity covered by the SCA""' it found itself faced with a dearth of
case law providing adequate discussion as to the precise theory
under which of the SCA's protections apply-that is, whether they
are in ECS "electronic storage" or RCS "back-up storage.""' In
regard to a particular communication [at a particular time, and not] upon broad
notions of the service that this entity generally or predominantly provides. Id.
152. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
153. However, in so holding the Crispin court made it clear that its decision
was also consistent with Theofel. It noted a Ninth Circuit amendment of the
original Theofel decision which made clear that a service provider could be both
an ECS and an RCS, and that if a user stores communications solely with an
RCS, it is not being held for "back-up" purposes. Id. (citing Theofel, 359 F.3d
at 1076-77). This amendment clarified that the original Theofel was not
unitary, but only appeared that way due to the facts of the case. Id.
154. Id. at 988.
155. Id.
156. See id. Further complicating matters, of the few decisions that had been
given, there had been several directly conflicting decisions, none of which offer
any reasons for the outcome given. The court in Konop treated a BBS on a
website as an ECS provider after holding that information thereon was held in
"electronic storage." Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 879 (9th
Cir. 2002). However, it "did not indicate whether th[is] storage was [type A]
temporary and immediate storage or [type B back-up storage]." Crispin, 717 F.
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response to this ambiguity the Crispin court first sought to
determine if the information was being held in "electronic
storage," the more restrictive of the two types of storage.
Unlike e-mail which is stored with an ISP while waiting delivery
to its final destination, an electronic bulletin board is the final
destination for a post.'" In other words, because a wall post does
not need to be opened, there is no intermediate step in which it is
held pending delivery and consequently is never in type A
temporary intermediate storage. Consequently, the court held that
in the context of electronic bulletin boards and bulletin board
services, there is never type A temporary and intermediate
electronic storage.'
However, the court did find that Facebook wall postings and
MySpace comments are held in type B back-up electronic storage,
and therefore these two entities were acting as ECS providers.'5 9
The courts reasoning was short, stating that precedent dictated
"that a user's or an ECS provider's passive decision not to delete a
communication after it has been read by the user renders that
communication stored for back-up purposes as defined in the
statute."'"
The Crispin court relied on the precedent in Konop v. Hawaiian
Airline, Inc. 6 ' In Konop the court held that information held on a
bulletin board service was held in electronic storage, but did not
further explain whether this was because the communications were
in type A storage or in type B storage.' 2 Nonetheless, the Crispin
court took note of this holding and then used two further steps in a
Supp. 2d at 988 (citing Konop 302 F.3d at. 879). Distinctly, a federal district
court in Texas summarily concluded that a BBS is an RCS provider on the basis
that it provides only remote storage. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret
Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 463 (5th Cir. 1994).
157. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 988 (citing Snow v. DIRECTV, Inc., No
2:04-CV-515FTM33SPC, 2005 WL 1226158 at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 9, 2005)
(finding that nobody could "allege that the messages are being stored [on a
BBS] while waiting to be transferred to [another] final destination.")).
158. Id. at 988-89.
159. Id. at 989.
160. Id. at 989 (referring to § 2510 (17)(B)).
161. 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
162. Id. at 879.
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chain of reasoning to get from the general rule handed down in
Konop to its outcome.
First, given that both the Crispin court (along with many others)
had already decided that there can be no type A storage in the
context of bulletin board services, 163 the court held that logically
Konop must be interpreted as "holding that the postings [on a
BBS], once made, are stored [in type B storage,] for back-up
purposes."l 64 Second, it reiterated that because "a BBS post is in
all material ways analogous to a Facebook wall posting or
MySpace comment" it is an inescapable conclusion that such
comments and wall postings are also being held for back-up
purposes.1' While this essentially linear train of reasoning is open
to criticism,'16 it suggests that the court was determined to apply
the SCA whenever possible and that it was in favor of granting the
protections that the SCA offers.
The court additionally committed itself to this position later in
the decision, when it held that alternatively "Facebook and
MySpace are RCS providers as respects the wall postings and
comments."'67 The court analogized these wall postings to storage
of user-created videos on YouTube.168 In both cases, the entity
provides a storage service for a user who had granted limited
access to the content to a prescribed group of people, in short a
classic RCS service.169 The court further held that Facebook and
YouTube were no less RCS providers simply because the media
that they stored was visual.o
163. Id.
164. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 988.
165. Id.
166. See infra notes 177-183 and accompanying text.
167. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 990.
168. Id. (citing Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 264
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
169. Id.; Viacom Int'1 Inc., 253 F.R.D. at 264.
170. The court reasoned that the very point of storage (i.e., retrieval) would
be made impossible without the data being visual in some manner. Crispin, 717
F. Supp. 2d at 990 (citing Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 359 (E.D.
Mich. 2008) ("[I]t is difficult to see how an archive of text messages would be
of any use or value to a customer if the service provider did not also offer a
mechanism for retrieving messages from this archive.").
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By providing this alternate justification for applying the SCA to
wall postings, the court further protected users' expectations of
privacy. This was a theme throughout the Crispin decision in
which the court took an expansive view of the SCA. Ultimately,
the court held that social media sites operate as ECS providers
with respect to unopened e-mails, wall posts, and comments, and
were acting as RCS providers with respect to opened e-mails and
private messages. Therefore, the SCA could be applicable to
every piece of information that a user uploads onto a social media
site."
IV. ANALYSIS
This part analyzes the Crispin decision, exploring not only the
advances that the case made to SCA jurisprudence, but also the
limitations inherent in the decision. It also highlights some of the
policies underlying the court's decision and attempts to use these
to predict how the case may influence later decisions and how the
law in this area may develop.
A. Opened E-mails
As noted above, the Crispin court was the first to consider
whether the SCA should apply to social media sites. As a result,
the case turned on principles of statutory interpretation as much as
prior case law (and therefore also the extent to which the court was
willing to try to enforce the purpose behind the statute).
Specifically, the amount of protection that the SCA would afford
to opened e-mails, if any, depended entirely on how the court
chose to interpret and apply the term "electronic storage." The
Crispin court held that e-mails or private messages that have been
previously opened are not held in electronic storage (i.e., were
neither stored temporarily nor for back-up purposes); therefore,
Facebook and MySpace were not acting as ECS providers with
respect those messages.'7 2 However, the court also held that any
171. Subject to other requirements, such as the entity being public, etc. See
supra notes 62-104 and accompanying text.
172. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 986.
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archived copies of these opened messages that Facebook and
MySpace had kept were being held in remote storage, meaning
that Facebook and MySpace were instead acting as RCS providers
with respect to these opened messages.' This was essentially a
compromise, limiting, but still providing a basic level of enhanced
protection for opened e-mails.
The court's interpretation of "electronic storage" in Crispin is
sound, and is the most consistent with the Act. Primarily, the
decision definitively and explicitly rejected the so-called "unitary
approach" of Quon and firmly established that the type of storage
that an entity is providing is a context sensitive inquiry. There is
little doubt that this is what Congress intended.174 In addition, by
declining to hold that opened e-mails are held in "back-up"
storage, the court avoided an overly broad definition of that term.
Although the court based its decision on common sense and plain
language,' its impact has significant ramifications. If an entity is
deemed to be holding a communication as a back-up, even if the
user does not have a copy, then the term "storage" (used to
determine when an entity is proving an RCS) would become
173. Id. at 990.
174. The drafters of the SCA apparently considered how the Act would apply
when a recipient opened an e-mail but then left it on the ISP server:
Sometimes the addressee, having requested and received a
message, chooses to leave it in storage on the service for re-
access at a later time. The Committee intends that, in leaving
the message in storage, the addressee should be considered the
subscriber or user from whom the system received the
communication for storage, and that such communication
should continue to be covered by section 2702(a)(2).
United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 773 (C.D. 111. 2009) (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 65 (1986)). Accepting that a private message on
Facebook or MySpace and a traditional e-mail are sufficiently similar, this is
strong evidence that the Crispin court adopted the correct approach. See also
Kerr, supra note 44, at 1215.
175. Because most users have web-based e-mail, they do not actually keep a
copy of their e-mails; rather the sole copy is in the possession of the provider in
question. Logically then, an entity cannot be keeping that message for "back-
up" purposes-one cannot back up something that does not exist. Rather, the
entity is providing a storage service for that e-mail so that the use can access a
copy at any time.
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redundant. Consequently, if the terms "back-up" and "storage"
were interchangeable, the distinction between ECS and RCS
providers would become illusory, rendering the less restrictive
provisions relating to RCS providers superfluous.'76 The court
manages to sidestep this problem and avoids violating the
generally accepted canon of statutory construction that a statute
should be read as a whole and to avoid redundancy. Although this
resulted in opened e-mails having only the lesser protections
associated with RCS providers, the decision is undoubtedly correct
in view of both the statutory text and common sense.
In addition, the court's definition of "remote storage" was well
considered. By classifying social media sites as RCS providers
with respect to open e-mails, it still allows a basic level protection
for users' information, and buttresses the Fourth Amendment right
to privacy. In essence, the court took a middle ground, choosing
the most logical position in light of the statute's language and the
aims that Congress sought to realize in its enactment.
B. Wall Postings
As noted above, the court held that information held on a wall
posting such as a bulletin board was being held in electronic
storage."' In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on
precedent from Konop without further exploration of the Act and
without forging any new ground."' While the outcome was most
likely correct, one unfortunate side effect of the court's borrowed
reasoning was that it robbed the court of the opportunity to explore
the issue in greater detail. While the chain of reasoning from
Konop was strong, it was completely predicated upon the
assumption that Konop is a correct statement of the law.
176. To explain, consider the alternative holding-that unopened e-mails are
held for back-up purposes even on web-based systems in which the user does
not retain a copy. In this scenario, the fact that the entity holds the e-mail as a
back-up would mean that it is held in type B electronic storage under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(17)(B). Consequently, the entity will be providing an ECS service. It
would be unnecessary to consider whether the e-mail was also held "in storage"
as an RCS because RCS providers offer less protection for the user.
177. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 989.
178. See supra notes 162-166 and accompanying text.
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Obviously the court's duty was to apply the precedent that binds it.
However, by not taking the time to fully explore the issue, the
court does not add much clarity to an area desperately in need of
some guidance, a fact that the court candidly acknowledged.179
This reasoning aside, it is fair to say the court nonetheless
arrived at the correct outcome. Primarily, it is clear that Congress
intended for the SCA to cover private electronic bulletin boards;
the relevant legislative history shows an unambiguous intent to try
to provide protection for information that the author tries to keep
private.'" And in turn, the court's decision furthers the simple
policy behind the Act: to ensure privacy for certain
communications when the Fourth Amendment fails.
However, there are perhaps alternate reasons for the court's
decision that social media sites are covered by the SCA. The
simple policy that was once behind the Act has been superseded by
new and more complex factors, and it would be naYve to believe
that these issues did not also play a role in the court's decision.
Stated bluntly, social media sites are now an industry in and of
themselves."' They are at the cutting edge of modem digital
communications technology, and an influx of subpoenas would
179. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 988 ("As the Ninth Circuit ... observed,
'until Congress brings the laws in line with modem technology, . .. [this] will
remain a confusing and uncertain area of law' (quoting Konop v. Hawaiian
Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002))).
180. Konop, 302 F.3d at 875 (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 35-36: "This
provision [of the SCA] addresses the growing problem of unauthorized persons
deliberately gaining access to . . . electronic or wire communications that are not
intended to be available to the public.").
181. See e.g., Social Media Marketing Report, MARKETING WHITE PAPERS
(Nov. 06, 2010), http://marketingwhitepapers.s3.amazonaws.com/
SocialMediaMarketingReport20l0.pdf. In 2009, social media games such as
Farmville and Mafia Wars generated an estimated $725 million in the United
States alone, an amount that is expected to triple by 2012. Paul Verna, Social
Gaming: Virtual Crops Yield Real Profits, EMARKETER (Oct. 19, 2010),
http://www.researchandmarkets.com/
reportinfo.asp?cat id=0&report id=1295470&q=social%20gaming%20&p=1.
It is predicted that in 2012 U.S. advertisers will spend $2.6 billion on social
media sites. Social Networking, PROCON.ORG, http://socialnetworking.
procon.org/#20 (last visited Nov. 22, 2011, 5:23 PM).
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undoubtedly have a negative effect on service providers.12 The
concern is that excessive subpoenas could impose a burden on
social media sites, not only limiting their economic productivity,
but also their contributions to technology.'
But the balance is a fine one. While there is no doubt that social
media sites have made positive contributions to society, it does not
necessarily follow that as a result they should be excused from the
182. See O'Grady v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d
72, 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006):
We also note the assertion by amicus curiae United States
Internet Industry Association (USIIA) that civil subpoenas are
often served on service providers and that compliance with
them would impose severe administrative burdens, interfering
with the manifest congressional intent to encourage
development and use of digital communications. The severity
of this burden cannot be determined from this record, but
the threat of routine discovery requests . . . would seemingly
permit civil discovery from the service provider whenever its
server is thought to contain messages relevant to a civil suit.
Id. Although the Crispin court makes no specific reference to such
considerations its decision is certainly in accord with the sentiment expressed by
the O'Grady court.
183. It would appear that Facebook agrees - it does not seem to welcome
subpoena requests for information. Until recently, its "Safety for Law Officers"
page "'urge[ed]' parties to civil litigation resolve their discovery issues without
involving Facebook." Digital Forensics & eDiscovery Advisory 1.14: Facebook
Subpoenas, CONTINUUM WORLDWIDE (Oct. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.continuumww.com/Home/Resources.aspx. It further stated that
"[a]lmost without exception, the information sought by parties to civil litigation
is in the possession of, and readily accessible to, a party to the litigation" before
concluding that "[r]equests for account information are therefore better obtained
through party discovery." Id. Although Facebook has since removed that page
and now promotes its clear policy of complying with legal requests, it still
dissuades users from issuing a subpoena to get information. Facebook's
manual, along with the Safety for Law Officers page make very apparent (1) its
duties and limits under the SCA, (2) the long list of requirements for a subpoena
stemming from § 2703(c), and (3) that it "reserves the right to charge a
reasonable fee" for this service. FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/
safety/groups/law/guidelines/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2011 3:15 PM). See also
Obtaining Records From Facebook, LinkedIn, Google and Other Social
Networking Websites and Internet Service Providers, FOR THE DEFENSE,
available at http://forthedefense.org/file.axd?file=2010%2F5%/o2FObtaining+
Records+From+Social+Networking+Websites.pdf.
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burdens answering subpoenas. Arguably society's interest in
justice for parties in civil suits should trump this fear if the
information sought really is unobtainable elsewhere. In light of
this balance, the court's resolve to extend this privacy (and
arguably protect the social media sites) will be tested as
Facebook's privacy settings continue to evolve. The Crispin court
seems to suggest that as long as access to a group is controlled, the
SCA will apply.'84 Indeed, the court stated that "the number of
users who can view the [wall posting] has no legal significance.""'
It further stated that "basing a rule on the number of users who can
access information would result in arbitrary line-drawing," and
could work to discriminate larger firms with thousands of
employees who can access the stored information, as this could
exclude the firm from the statute's reach.'8 6
While the logic of this statement is sound, the practical
implications of such a rule may be unworkable. Shifting from an
analytical perspective to a common sense approach highlights the
other side of this debate. If the purpose of the SCA is to provide a
Fourth Amendment-like expectation of privacy, it is fair to ask
whether the SCA should protect users who share information with
thousands of people, even if those people have been handpicked
and individually approved. How reasonable can it be it to expect
that information to stay private? And how legitimate is the
distinction between the user who creates a completely open
Facebook group and a user who indiscriminately accepts everyone
and anyone into that group upon request?'
184. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991.
185. Id. at 190.
186. Id.
187. This will become even more of an issue after the Sixth Circuit's
landmark case in Warshak v. United States, 631 F.3d 266 (6th. Cir. 2010). In
that case the Sixth Circuit held that a user does have a Fourth Amendment right
to privacy in e-mails sent, even when sent through a third party ISP. Id. at 282.
The Warshak decision-if accepted and applied in more jurisdictions-could
very well act as grease on the slippery slope. If the courts accept that users have
a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy in e-mails sent, the next issue
will become whether users have the same expectations in wall posts and photo-
albums posted online that have only limited access to other users. And if
protection is forthcoming, how limited will these groups have to be, and what
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How a court would deal with these issues remains unknown. It
might even be fair to say that under the current statutory scheme
these questions have no satisfactory answer. After putting the
problems of judicial interpretation and general inconsistency aside,
the root of the problem can still be traced back to the SCA. It is
simply not designed to deal with modem technology.'" The Act
itself does not even use the term "e-mail," let alone "social media
site."' Mark Zuckerberg-founder of Facebook-was barely two
when the SCA was passed. And the rate of technological
advancement is only increasing."o Simply put, the SCA is ill-
equipped to provide a solution. Although the Crispin court
probably came to the right decision, the means it used to get there
were strained. The next part of this Comment addresses the
practical problems and real-life impact that this confusion and
uncertainty has not only on the legal system, but also on society in
general.
criteria will be used to judge "exclusiveness"? Current law suggests that the
actual number of persons able to view these postings was not dispositive and
had no legal significance. The court noted that basing a legal rule on the
amount of people who could view the messages would result in arbitrary line
drawing. Instead the court focused on the statutory inquiry as to whether the
general public had access to the information: "It shall not be unlawful under [the
SCA] for any person . . . to . . . access an electronic communication made
through an electronic communication system that is configured so that such
electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(g)(i). Therefore it seems that so long as the user maintains some
minimal control over privacy settings the court will find sufficient privacy. This
argument is perhaps disingenuous however; if a user indiscriminately accepts all
friend requests, it is hard to argue that the user expects privacy, and that the
information is not readily accessible to the public. Of course, from a purely
practical standpont this may be a moot point; the more people that have access
to the wall, the more likely that it will be directly discoverable from one of them
(independent of the SCA).
188. See Kerr, supra note 44, at 1233-42.
189. See Stored Wire and Electronics Communications and Transaction
Record Access (Stored Communications Act), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
190. Ray Kurzweil, Time to Embrace Technological Change, NATIONAL
PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.npr.org/temnplates/
story/story.php?storyld=5563001.
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V. IMPACT
A. Necessity of Reform
1. Legal Perspective
It is clear from the mental and verbal gymnastics and
inconsistent results reached by different courts that this is an old
and outdated statute. The Crispin court explicitly acknowledges
this."' The court also acknowledged the need for reform,
admitting that until a new framework is implemented this will
remain "a confusing and uncertain area of the law."' 92 The Crispin
court is not alone in this sentiment. Many other scholars, most
notably Professor Orin S. Kerr, have also called for reform to the
SCA.'9 3 This paper agrees with that position, but further contends
that that reform must come from statute as opposed to piece-by-
piece change effected through judicial activism. First, several
courts have already grappled with the problems inherent in
applying the SCA to modem technology and have had little
success. Not only have courts found it difficult to interpret the
Act, but those difficulties have been magnified into an inconsistent
and confusing body of case law.'94 At one extreme, a Pennsylvania
191. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 988 ("The difficulty in interpreting the
statute is compounded by the fact that the [SCA] was written prior to the advent
of the Internet and the World Wide Web. As a result, the existing statutory
framework is ill-suited to address modem forms of communication like
[Facebook and MySapce].") (internal quotations omitted).
192. Id.
193. See Kerr, supra note 44, at 1233-42, calling for among other things
increase protections, simplification, and a suppression remedy. This last reform
would fit particularly well with the court's and Act's apparent intent to fully
protect privacy. See also Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the "Fog" of Internet
Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime
Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 820-21 (2003)).
194. "Courts have taken inconsistent approaches in applying the SCA to
social network information and many of these cases have obvious flaws. Even
the Crispin decision, which represents a step in the right direction, provides
incomplete guidance in determining whether social networks should be
protected from disclosing certain content under the SCA." Ward, supra note 5,
at 588.
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court recently held that everything posted a social media site is
essentially discoverable because the user has no legitimate
expectation of privacy.' At the other end of the scale, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals has recently held that a user has a
complete expectation of privacy in e-mails sent, and therefore, in
so much as the SCA allows law enforcement agencies to acquire
content sent through e-mail without a warrant, it is
unconstitutional.'96 This inconsistency is unacceptable in such an
important area of the law, and the courts' inability to come to
create a uniform jurisprudence suggests that the legislature must
take the initiative to introduce a comprehensive solution to the
problem. Second, a comprehensive and wholesale reform would
result in greater consistency in this area of law than piecemeal
decisions.' In an area of such legal significance and practical
importance, users of technology deserve to know how just how
private their communications really are.' Finally, with the
constitutionality of this area still unclear,'99 it is for the legislature
195. McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., Case No. 113-2010 CD,
2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 270, at *3-4 (Pa. D. & C. Sept. 9, 2010).
Note however that this decision appears to be untenable for several reasons, not
least for the fact that is clearly violates the SCA. Eric Goldman, Court Orders
Disclosure of Facebook and MySpace Passwords in Personal Injury Case -
McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Oct. 30,
2010), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/20 10/10/court orders di 1.htm.
196. Warshak v. United States, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th. Cir. 2010).
197. Even some of the more reasoned cases in this area cannot alone provide
the guidance and clarification needed. See generally Ward, supra note 5, at
588; About the Issue, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS: MODERNIZING SURVEILLANCE
LAWS FOR THE MODERN AGE, http://digitaldueprocess.org/
index.cfm?objectid=37940370-2551-1IDF-8EO2000C296BA163 (last visited
Nov. 18, 2011 07:23 AM).
198. When it comes to internet privacy, "[everyone] deserve[s] clear and
simple rules." Id.
199. With last year various courts have given conflicting decisions as to
whether the Fourth Amendment applies directly to e-mail let alone whether the
SCA applies. Traditionally e-mails have not been protected by the Fourth
Amendment as this requires disclosure to third party. MATHEW BENDER,
PRIVACY LAW AND THE USA PATRIOT ACT § 2.03 (2011). But a recent Sixth
Circuit decision held that a user does have a privacy interest in an email sent.
Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288. While the law is unclear, one thing is certain-as yet
there is no definite answer to many of these important questions.
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to make the reform. In such an uncertain area, any reform must
come from a body that is not only directly elected, but who has the
resources to properly investigate the necessary changes,
adequately analyze proposed changes, and to authoritatively
implement the change.
2. A Policy Perspective
The SCA needs to be reformed through legislation. But the need
for reform runs deeper than a mere theoretical interest in the
uniformity and clarity of decisions, and this Comment is designed
to examine this issue from more than a purely legal standpoint.
There are issues with the SCA that have consequences far outside
the courtroom. Law is the bedrock of society, and it must provide
a solid foundation upon which companies of all sizes are able to
build, and this solid foundation only becomes more necessary as
we continually strive to build higher and greater things. One of the
newest trends in the computer and technology fields is the rapid
expansion of "cloud computing."20 As this technology has
developed, more and more businesses have sought to take
advantage of this powerfil tool,20 1 which promises potential
savings in costs, time, productivity, and flexibility.20 2 But learning
a valuable lesson from the foolish man who build his house on
200. Cloud computing is a modem form of data storage. It is "an emerging
architecture by which data and applications reside in cyberspace, allowing users
to access them through any web-connected device." Diane Murley, Law
Libraries in the Cloud, 101 LAW LIBR. J. 249, 249-50 (2009) (quoting John B.
Horrigan, Use of Cloud Computing Applications and Services, PEW INTERNET &
AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT (Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/
2008/Use-of-Cloud-Computing-Applications-and-Services/Data-Memo.aspx.
For a more detailed overview, see David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the
Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles to Evolving Privacy
Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REv. 2205, 2216-18 (2009).
201. Comments on Information Privacy and Innovation in the Internet
Economy, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS 5 (June 14, 2010),
http://www.digitaldueprocess.org/files/NTIANOI 061410.pdf.
202. David Raths, Will Clouds Reign?, 6 PUB. CIO 18, 22-23 (2008); Dan
Lohrmann, How Safe is Cloud Computing?, PUBLIC CIO (Jan. 26, 2011),
http://www.govtech.com/pcio/How-Safe-is-Cloud-Computing.html.
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sand,203 companies have been slow to fully embrace cloud
computing over fears about privacy.204 Without a clear and
consistent body of law concerning disclosure of information stored
"in the cloud," fewer companies are using this technology. 2 05
Moreover, companies will be less willing to use the versions that
are available.20 6 The knock-on effects of this are no less
troublesome; as the legislature fails to address this cutting edge
area, it is the United States that is suffering.207 Potential businesses
are moving abroad and the domestic economy is missing out on
this $100 billion dollar market.208
Clarity is not the only major shortcoming of the SCA. Even in
parts that have been definitively interpreted the law still fails to
create a modern standard for privacy on the Internet. And these
drawbacks are not limited to faceless corporations and large-scale
issues; the lack of guidance also has an impact on an individual
level. Privacy has famously been called "the right most valued by
civilized men."209 But as we store more information online instead
of in paper form, that right is put in jeopardy, not because of an
inherent shift in legal doctrine, but due to both legislative inaction
and the rapidly evolving nature of the relevant technology. Until
the legislature ends this reluctance to modernize the law and sets a
workable and clear standard for Internet privacy, the potential
benefits of new technology will never be fully realized.
203. Matthew 7:26.
204. See Horrigan, supra note 202, at 5.
205. Id. at 4.
206. Id.
207. Jeffery Rayport & Andrew Heyward, Envisioning the Cloud: The Next
Computing Paradigm, MARKETSPACE, 38 (Mar. 20, 2009),
http://marketspacenext.files.wordpress.com/20 11/01 /envisioning-the-cloud.pdf.
208. Markus Klems, Merrill Lynch Estimates "Cloud Computing" To Be
$100 Billion Market, WEB2JOURNAL (Jan. 19, 2011), http://web2.sys-
con.com/node/604936.
209. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). And it appears that this right is no less coveted in the internet
domain; eighty-eight percent of Americans believe that internet users should be
entitled to the same level of privacy protection as have traditionally been
afforded to offline information, while only four percent actively disagree.
Results from June 4-7 Nationwide Poll, ZOGBY INTERNATIONAL (June 7, 2010),
http://www.precursorblog.com/files/pdf/topline-report-key-findings.pdf.
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A prime example of how both individuals and companies are
affected by both the courts' inability to tread a consistent path and
the legislature's reluctance to provide them with an adequate map
is the increasing use of location data. Amidst (and perhaps
despite) cries of "Big Brother,"210 cell-phone tracking technology
has arrived, and is growing at a rapid pace.21' This allows a user to
be traced, and for anyone with permission, to determine exactly
where he or she is at any given moment.2 12 While many potential
businesses have sought to capitalize on this potential new
market,213 many consumers have been wary, largely because the
"laws are [ ] years behind technology."2 14 For this market to reach
its potential, the end users of the products have to feel confident
that the information gathered is not going to be abused. Because
location data is so easy to store and collate, without adequate
privacy protections many consumers fear that their data will be
mishandled.2 15 Under the current law this fear is not ungrounded;
location data is not "content information" and so is subject to the
lesser protections of the SCA, if it applies at all.216 Simply put,
210. Richard Ford, 'Big Brother' Database for Phones and E-mails, THE
TIMES (May 20, 2008), http://msl1.mit.edu/furdlog/docs/2008-05-
20 times dataveillance.pdf.
211. Michael B. Farrell, Cellphone Tracking Services: Friend Finder or Big
Brother?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (May 1, 2009),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Innovation/Tech-Culture/2009/050 1 /cellphone-
tracking-services-friend-finder-or-big-brother.
212. For more information, see, e.g., How Cell Phone Tracking Works,
TECH-FAQ, http://www.tech-faq.com/how-cell-phone-tracking-works.html (last
visited Nov. 22, 2011).
213. The scale of this market could reach over twelve billion in the next three
years. Robin Wauters, Mobile Location-Based Services Could Rake in $12.7
Billion by 2014: Report,
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 23, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/02/23/location-
based-services-revenue/.
214. Michael B. Farrell, supra note 211.
215. Janice Y. Tsai, Patrick Gage Kelley, Lorrie Faith Cranor & Norman
Sadeh, Location-Sharing Technologies: Privacy Risks and Controls, 6 I/S: J.L.
& POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'Y 199, 199 , (2010),
http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/LBSprivacy/files/TsaiKelleyCranorSadeh 2009.pdf.
216. Ford, supra note 210. While not subject to the SCA the British
government had even suggested a scheme whereby this information would be
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under its current interpretation the SCA does not adequately
guarantee the right to privacy, which is hampering, or at least
delaying, technological advancement.2 17 In many ways this is
expected; most of current issues regarding the SCA involve
technology that was not even considered possible, let alone in use
at the time of the SCA's enactment. But in turn, that means these
problems cannot be fixed by judicial interpretation of the SCA.2 18
There exists a real need for a new framework that specifically
deals with the new issues that have surfaced.
VI. CONCLUSION
Just as the Wiretap was considered obsolete in 1986, so too has
the SCA met a similar fate. 2 19 But unlike 1986, when Congress
realized that the then current law had become antiquated, the
kept on record for a period of time. Id. An overhaul of the SCA could help
appease these fears in the United States.
217. DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, supra note 197.
218. Assuming that it could be properly called judicial interpretation at all.
If judges are tasked with trying to fix issues that were unforeseen at the time of
the SCA's enactment they would not be engaging in interpretation of the statute
at all, but would cross the line into judicial activism, yet another reason for the
legislature to step in.
219. Both scholars and judges alike have noted that the Stored
Communications Act is unable to provide robust and adequate protections
against government search of communications stored in a physical location but
in an intangible form, predominantly online communications and e-mail
conversations. "The Internet present[s] a host of potential privacy issues that
the Fourth Amendment does not address. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating
Co., 529 F.3d 892, 900 (9th. Cir. 2008). "In Konop, the Ninth Circuit noted. . .
the existing statutory framework is ill-suited to address modem forms of
communication." Murray v. Fin. Visions, Inc., No. CV-07-2578-PHX-FJM,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93419, at *15-16 (Nov. 6, 2008). See also Kerr, supra
note 44, stating that the Fourth Amendment alone "cannot ... provide robust
protections for online communications for intangible property." In fact Kerr
goes further, suggesting that the "the details of how the Internet works make it
almost 'custom designed' to frustrate . . . protections in remotely stored files."
Id. at 1212. Testimony has even been given to a U.S. House Judiciary
Committee on the subject of how the SCA is obsolete. Fred H. Cate, Stored
Communications Act (SCA) Needs Revisions, IU NEWSROOM (Sept. 23 2010),
http://newsinfo.iu.edu/news/page/normal/15669.html.
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current Congress has not had the same "noteworthy display of
foresight,"2 20 and seen the need for amendments to the SCA. In
summary: inaction has led to obsolescence. "The [benefits of
technology] should not come at the price of privacy."22 '
It is not the courts' place to overhaul this area. Such a complex
and immense task falls clearly on the shoulders of the legislature.
However, in the conspicuous absence of any action on the
legislature's behalf, others they have picked up the torch.222 Even
the courts are starting to walk down paths of reform on which the
legislature seem unwilling to tread.223 One can certainly
understand why the courts have taken on this role; interpretation
has been needed, and the legislature has been slow to respond. But
it is nonetheless important to realize this judicial action for what it
is; a temporary respite as opposed to a final solution. Legislative
action is needed lest the courts be forced into Congress' role.
Without doubt, the Crispin decision is a well considered opinion
that will only gain importance as more courts are left to define the
scope of electronic discovery rights in the field of social media
sites. Similarly there is little doubt that Crispin will help guide
other courts to a more thorough and considered approach to
electronic communications of social-media sites. But it is
important to remember that neither Crispin, nor any other court
can provide definitive answers to the problems posed by the SCA.
Instead, they have merely created a platform for legislative action.
It can only be hoped that Congress takes note of this, and that
220. See Perez-Albuerne & Friedman, supra note 41, at 436.
221. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. ofJustice of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 4-21 (2010) (Statement of James X. Dempsey,
Vice President for Public Policy, Center for Democracy and Technology),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/1Ith/1 11-
98 56271.PDF.
222. In the absence of any legislative action, various groups, distinguished
scholars, and professors have repeatedly called for reform. See, e.g., Kerr, supra
note 46, at 1232-33; Cate, supra note 225.
223. See, e.g., the court's expansive view of the SCA in Crispin v. Christian
Audigier Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 989 (C.D. Cal. 2010). For a more forceful
(and less patient approach) see the recent Sixth Circuit decision in which parts
of the SCA were recently held to be unconstitutional. Warshak v. United States,
631 F. 3d 266, 288 (6th. Cir. 2010).
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through its completeness, its importance, and its admonishment of
the Act as a whole, Crispin may help not only to guide future
judicial opinion but also may eventually encourage and shape
legislative reform.
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